Security Conference
Security Conference
Table of contents:
Black Hat
Agentic AI Attack Surface
| Attack Type | Description | Example | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prompt Injection | Malicious instructions hidden in prompts or external content. | AI told to give away secrets or execute destructive commands. | 🔴 High |
| Context Poisoning | Corrupting training or inference-time data fed to model. | Adding misleading info to a database LLM queries. | 🔴 High |
| Access Control Issues | “Confused deputy” – agent has more privileges than user. | Low-priv user triggers high-priv agent action. | 🔴 High |
| Tool Misuse | Exploiting agents’ tool access to run harmful commands. | AI executes file delete instead of file read. | 🟠 Medium |
| Memory Poisoning | Altering short/long-term memory to influence future behavior. | Fake “facts” stored in agent memory. | 🟠 Medium |
| Cascading Hallucination | Error from one agent spreads to others. | Wrong data from Agent A causes bad output in Agent B. | 🟠 Medium |
Security Controls
| Control | Purpose | Tools/Methods |
|---|---|---|
| Model Scanning | Detect malware in model files. | Antivirus + AI-specific scanners. |
| Runtime Security | Catch abnormal AI behavior during execution. | Anomaly detection, runtime firewalls. |
| Human-in-the-loop | Approve/deny high-risk AI actions. | Review checkpoints in workflows. |
| AuthN/AuthZ | Control agent-to-agent communications. | OAuth 2.0, OIDC, mTLS, X.509 certs. |
| Context Sanitization | Clean and validate external inputs. | Filtering, regex checks, schema validation. |
| Logging & Auditing | Trace agent actions & context changes. | Centralized logging, immutable audit logs. |
AI-Defensive Use Cases
| Use Case | How AI Helps | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Threat Intel | Correlate CVEs, exploits, chatter in real time. | AI parses GitHub, social media, CVE feeds. |
| Vuln Prioritization | Rank vulnerabilities by exploit activity & business impact. | Prioritize based on attacker chatter. |
| AI Code Review | Multi-agent PR analysis by security domain. | Developer agent + Architect agent + Security agent. |
Agentic AI Threat Surface
AI agents can execute tools, access data, and interact with other agents — all of which expand the attack surface.
- Risks include:
- Prompt injection (malicious instructions in prompts)
- Context poisoning (compromising the data fed into the model)
- Access control issues (e.g., confused deputy problem)
- Tool misuse and cascading hallucinations
- Memory poisoning (short-term & long-term)
- Orchestrator → specialized agent architectures multiply risks.
Context as the Primary Attack Vector
Context comes from instructions, memory, tools, and other models.
Protect both inference-time and training-time context.
- Context is King
- Sources of context:
- Direct instructions (prompts)
- Short-term memory (chat history)
- Long-term memory (vector DB, docs, code)
- Tool outputs
- Other LLMs
- LLMs do NOT distinguish between system prompt and user prompt — corruption anywhere is dangerous.
- LLMs treat all context (system prompts, user prompts) as one — making poisoned context highly dangerous.
- Context Protection
- Techniques to validate, sanitize, and isolate context sources.
- Monitoring for unexpected context changes.
Evolution of AI Agents
- LLM apps → Tool-using agents → MCP-based agents → upcoming auto-discovery & self-modifying agents → general-purpose agents.
Security Controls & Recommendations
- Scan models for malicious code.
- Add runtime security and logging for AI apps.
- Use human-in-the-loop for high-risk actions.
- Apply traditional security principles (auth, authz, least privilege) to AI systems.
Consider protocols for agent-to-agent authentication (OAuth2.0, mTLS, certificates).
- Authentication & Authorization for AI Agents
- How OAuth2.0, OpenID Connect, mTLS, and certificate-based auth can be applied to agent-to-agent communications.
- Limitations of existing protocols in AI agent ecosystems.
Defensive AI Use Cases
Threat intelligence enrichment (correlating CVEs, exploits, and chatter).
AI-augmented vulnerability prioritization.
AI-driven code review (multi-agent review pipeline).
Lockheed Martin’s AI Security Approach
Prioritize open-weight models from trusted vendors.
Key pillars:
Traceable & transparent stack
Secure stack (T&E, monitoring, adversarial testing, AI BOM)
Guardrails (e.g., Llama Guard) help but don’t solve model misalignment.
Model Alignment & Governance
- Guardrails vs. alignment issues.
- AI Bill of Materials (AI BOM) concept.
- Approaches to AI red teaming.
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